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The information that is created and disseminated through the litigation process can have 
social value.  When economic agents learn about risks, they can fine-tune their future 
behaviors to mitigate these risks.  Specifically, suppose that an injured plaintiff sues a 
defendant for damages sustained in an accident.    In the future, the plaintiff may be harmed 
in similar accidents involving different defendants.  The first lawsuit creates valuable 
information that the future defendants can use to fine-tune their investments in accident 
prevention.  If the plaintiff and the first defendant are symmetrically uninformed about the 
true damages, their private incentive to litigate the first case is too small.    If the plaintiff and 
the first defendant are asymmetrically informed, then the incentive to litigate the first case 
may be too large.  The optimal liability rule trades off the need to provide defendants with 
incentives to take precautions and to provide the plaintiff with incentives to create valuable 
public information through litigation. 
 
1.  Introduction 
  In 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground off the coast of Alaska and spilling some 11 
million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.  The spill affected approximately 
1,500 miles of Alaska's coastline killing billions of salmon, on order of a million seabirds, 
thousands of otters, and hundreds of bald eagles.
2  Exxon paid about $2.5 billion to cover the 
two years of cleanup efforts.  After investigations to assess the value of the environmental 
damages themselves, Exxon settled in 1991 with the state of Alaska for $1 Billion.  The 
                                                        
1  Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 
60208. xyhua@kellogg.northwestern.edu and k-spier@kellogg.northwestern.edu.  We 
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at Georgetown Law School for helpful comments.  We would especially like to thank 
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2 Wilkinson  (2002).    Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Presssettlement also included a so-called "reopener clause" that allowed the government to seek an 
additional $100 million in the future if new damages were discovered within a decade.
3   
This paper argues that the accurate determination of damages -- even those that may 
become known years later -- provides those engaging in similar risky activities with valuable 
information for future decision-making.  This point is of course not unique to environmental 
damages.  Manufacturer liability for product-related harms does more than simply provide 
manufacturers with better incentives to design safer products and disclose known product risks 
to consumers.  Manufacturer liability is also a mechanism for creating and disseminating 
information about these risks.  The information that is made public through litigation puts 
both product users and other manufacturers in a better position to take precautions to mitigate 
their future risks.
4     
  Formally, this paper considers a simple framework where a single plaintiff faces a 
sequence of defendants.    The first accident has already occurred, while the accidents involving 
future defendants have not.  The accidents are similar in the sense that the plaintiff's damages 
from the accidents are positively correlated.  Litigation is socially valuable in this setting 
because pretrial investigations and trials provide information about accident risks to the future 
defendants.  The future defendants can then fine tune their precautions to avoid the second 
accident.  We ask several questions.  First, is the plaintiff's decision to litigate the first case 
socially desirable?  Second, how should the liability rule be adjusted in light of a divergence?  
Finally, does the presence of asymmetric information change these answers? 
                                                        
3 Carlton  (2001). 
4  Individuals who have been exposed to asbestos, for example, can reduce the chance of 
developing severe asbestos-related illnesses by avoiding cigarettes and dust.  http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69 We first consider a case where the plaintiff and the defendants are symmetrically 
uninformed about the damages from an accident.  In the Exxon Valdez case, it was not 
initially clear how high the environmental damages were.    Careful investigations before the 
trial allowed the litigants to more accurately pinpoint the damages that arise from oil spills.  
If there is no possibility of a similar case arising in the future then the first case will surely 
settle -- there is no sense spending money to determine the precise level of damages when a 
quick settlement can be obtained at the expected damage level.  When similar cases may 
arise in the future, however, then settlement negotiations could fail.  In particular, the 
long-lived plaintiff can benefit from the affect that the information from the first trial has on 
the future defendants' precautions.  The plaintiff's incentive to generate information is not 
socially optimal, however, since the future defendants typically capture some of the social 
benefit of increased information.     
  The symmetric information case also gives us insights into how liability rules should 
be designed.  Taking the plaintiff's decision to settle or litigate the first case as fixed, the best 
liability rule would put 100% responsibility the player who needs to be given incentives for 
care -- the future defendants in our example.  But the plaintiff's settlement decision is 
endogenous and hinges on the liability rule.  When the plaintiff bears no responsibility for his 
own damages he captures none of the information value and will therefore prefer to settle the 
first case.  To put it somewhat differently, putting 100% responsibility on the defendants will 
chill the flow of information.  The optimal liability rule will balance the need to provide 
defendants with appropriate incentives and the need to create public information and will often 
feature shared responsibility for accident harms. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  These results may change when the plaintiff and the first defendant are 
asymmetrically informed about the damages.  Suppose that the plaintiff has private 
information about the damages he has sustained and the first defendant can make a single 
take-or-or-leave-it offer before trial.  Bargaining failures arise in equilibrium: when the 
plaintiff's damages are sufficiently high the plaintiff will reject the defendant's offer and go to 
trial where litigation costs are incurred.
5  In short, value is destroyed as the litigants engage in 
rent seeking activities and take tough bargaining stances in an attempt to grab a greater share of 
the bargaining surplus.  When the plaintiff's long-run value from information disclosure is 
small then the equilibrium level of litigation is socially excessive.  
 This paper contributes to the large literature on settlement of litigation (see the 
surveys of Daughety, 1999, and Hay and Spier, 1998).    Although most of the early literature 
focused on disputes between a single defendant and a single plaintiff -- often with 
asymmetric information -- more recent papers have considered externalities among multiple 
litigants.  Even in the absence of private information, externalities can lead settlement 
negotiations to fail.
6    Some of the externalities come from underlying correlation among the 
claims.  Daughety and Reinganum (1999, 2002) argue that confidential settlements are a 
way for the defendant to keep information about the lawsuit a secret from future plaintiffs. 
                                                        
5    Although the framework with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, based on Bebchuk (1984), seems 
extreme, the results are actually more general.    The bargaining environment features 
common values and any bargaining game will lead to negotiation breakdowns with positive 
probability.    See the mechanism-design model of Spier (1994). 
6    Spier (2003) looks at externalities between multiple plaintiffs who are suing a potentially 
insolvent defendant.  Spier and Sykes (1998) explore the externalities between settling 
plaintiffs and debtholders. Kornhauser and Revesz (1994a) and (1994b) look at multiple 
defendant lawsuits under joint and several liability, focusing on the externalities in settlement 
decisions.  http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69Externalities also can create strong incentives for parties to consolidate their claims (Che, 
1996 and 2002, Spier 2002).    Public policies, such as precedent, also create externalities and 
lead parties to adjust their settlement strategies (Che and Yi, 1993).
7  None of these papers 
consider the ex post incentive effects identified here.   
Second, our paper adds a new twist to the debate over the social value of accuracy in 
adjudication (see the survey by Kaplow, 1998).  Kaplow and Shavell (1996) have argued that 
the accurate assessment of damages at trial can be valuable in creating better ex ante incentives.  
If an injurer knows ex ante that his actions could lead to higher social losses -- and that he will 
be held liable for the higher damages -- then he will take greater care to avoid the accident.  If, 
on the other hand, if the injurer lacks the knowledge that the social harm will be unusually large 
(and cannot easily acquire the information) then accuracy has no social value.  Since the 
accurate determination of damages at trial is very costly, their argument goes, society would be 
better served by policies where injurers are held responsible only for the damages that they 
could have reasonably anticipated ex ante.
8  This paper takes a different perspective: accuracy 
in adjudication creates social value by informing future players about the risks associated with 
their activities and creating better ex post incentives.   
  Finally, this paper adds to the small but growing literature on the divergence between 
the private and social incentives to litigate and settle lawsuits.  Shavell (1997) argues that 
the incentives of private parties to use the legal system typically diverge from what is best for 
                                                        
7 Miller (1998) presents a survey, highlighting the conflict of interest between the plaintiffs 
and the (often self-appointed) attorney.
    
8 Spier (1994) argues that accuracy is valuable when ex ante care levels affect the level of 
damages, not just the probability of an accident.  Kaplow and Shavell (1994) consider the 
value of accuracy when the main issue at trial is liability, not damages. Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Presssociety as a whole.  The resources wasted in litigation do not always have a corresponding 
social benefit.    Costs would be saved -- and the proper ex ante incentives maintained -- if the 
parties settled for the "average" judgment instead.
9  In contrast to the literature, this paper 
takes a forward-looking perspective by arguing that early settlement can compromise the 
future incentives of the players. 
 The next section presents the general framework.  The third section assumes that 
the players are symmetrically uninformed about future damages and shows that the private 
incentive to settle is stronger than the social incentive.  The fourth section presents an 
example where the plaintiff is privately informed about his damages at date 1, and shows that 
the private incentive to settle may be either too weak or too strong.  The final section 
concludes.  The proofs that are not included in the main text are given in the technical 
appendix. 
 
                                                        
9 Disagreements over liability, on the other hand, can create incentives to settle too often in 
the sense that defendants will take too little care in anticipation of a future settlement (Spier, 
1997).     http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art692.  The  Model 
There are N+1 players: a plaintiff (P) who has suffered harm,  h, a current defendant 
(D1) who has caused the harm, and a group of  1 N −  future  defendants  (D2, D3, … DN) who 
may harm the plaintiff at a future date.  All players are risk-neutral.  We assume that the 
damages caused by the N defendants are perfectly correlated; in the event of an accident the 
future defendants cause harm h as well.
10  The damages are drawn from distribution  () h f  
on  ) , 0 [ ∞  with mean h .   We assume that  () h f h F / )] ( 1 [ −  is strictly decreasing in h.
11 
Although this distribution is common knowledge, the realization of  h is not observed.  If 
the plaintiff pursues litigation against the first defendant, however, then investigations will be 
conducted and the true value of h will be accurately verified and publicly disclosed.     
In the event of an accident, the court will force the responsible defendant to pay 
fraction  [] 1 , 0 α∈  of the plaintiff's damages. The parameter α , the "liability rule," is a 
choice variable for a social planner who seeks to maximize social welfare.  Trials are 
assumed to be costly: the plaintiff's litigation cost is  P k   and the defendant's litigation cost is 
D k  and we let k represent the total litigation cost. The "American Rule" is in effect: each 
side bears its own litigation costs.
12   
The future defendants are fully aware of the existence of the first case and take careful 
note of its disposition, including the precise value of  h if the first case goes to trial. These 
defendants also play an active role in preventing future accidents:
   Each future defendant Di, 
                                                        
10 This simplification is not restrictive.  The basic result would hold so long as the damage 
levels for all cases are positively correlated.   
11  This monotone hazard rate assumption is satisfied by many common distributions. 
12  Our basic results do not hinge on the cost allocation rule.  Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressi=2,….N, makes non-verifiable precautions, xi, to reduce the probability of an accident.
13  
Formally, the probability that Di will cause an accident is  i i x 1 ) x ( π − =  and  () i x c  is Di's 
associated cost of precautions.  We assume that the cost function is strictly increasing and 
convex and satisfies the following conditions:  () 0 0 = c ,  () 0 x ' c = ,  () ∞ =
→
x ' c Lim
1 x
, and 
() 0 x c ≤ ′′′ .
14   
The timing of the game is as follows.  At date 1, P and D1 attempt to negotiate a 
settlement.    If negotiations succeed then the first round ends and if negotiations fail the first 
case goes to trial where  h is verified and publicly disclosed.  D1 is forced to pay  h α  to 
the plaintiff and the defendant and plaintiff bear litigation costs kd and kp, respectively.  At 
date 2 the future defendants choose their precautions.  Accidents subsequently occur as 
described above and the plaintiff and the responsible defendant engage in settlement 
negotiations.   If negotiations fail the case goes to trial where the defendant pays  h α  to the 
plaintiff and litigation costs kd and kp are borne.    Note that there may be anywhere between 0 
and N new accidents. The assumption that future defendants choose precautions and cause 
accidents at exactly the same time is for expository convenience; the results would be 
unchanged if they arrived in sequence instead.
15 
                                                        
13  Note that we do not consider the precautions taken by the first defendant.    A firm selling 
automobiles, for example, could certainly take actions to reduce the possible damage level to 
buyers.  If these precautions were observable, however, then firms could internalize these 
through ex-ante pricing or contracting.  We simplify issues by ignoring the effect of court 
policies on the early defendant’s precautions. Moreover, if the probability to become the first 
defendant is small enough, then each potential defendant has incentive to wait for more 
information so that he has little incentive to make ex-ante precaution.  Or even if he has 
incentive ex-ante, since there is no information on real damage level yet, it could be shown 
that courts would take policies to induce too few trials, which reinforces our results below.   
14  The last assumption on the third derivative is a weak sufficient condition for later results.     
15  We will see that the plaintiff's incentive to litigate and release information is stronger when 
there are more accidents waiting to happen (N is larger).    If the defendants arrive in  http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69Note that settlement negotiations always take place under symmetric information.  
The plaintiff's share of the bargaining surplus (if a positive surplus exists) is represented by a 
parameter  θ  and we make the simplifying assumption that  0 k θ k ) θ 1 ( d p = − − .  This 
would be satisfied if, for example, the two litigants had equal litigation costs  ) k k ( d p =  and 
equal bargaining power  ) 5 . θ ( = .  This assumption implies that the plaintiff would like to 
avoid future accidents.    If the plaintiff had too much bargaining power, for example, then he 
would benefit from future accidents when  α is very large.  The plaintiff would want to 
stimulate additional accidents for their settlement value rather than prevent them.
16 This 
assumption also implies that settlement in the second round will be "accurate" -- reflecting 
the defendant's expected liability at trial.     
Notice that although early litigation with D1 involves a real costs,  d p k k + , it also 
provides private and social benefits.  In particular, the information that is verified in the 
courtroom -- and subsequently made public -- is used by the future defendants when making 
real economic decisions.  It is also clear that the private and social incentives to litigate 
typically diverge.  The decision to settle the first case involves only two of the players, P 
and D1, while the litigation decision also affects the welfare of the future defendants.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
sequence then the plaintiff would, in equilibrium, either litigate in the first round or not at all. 
16  Relaxing this assumption would create special cases associated with extreme liability rules.   
The main insights of the paper would not be affected, however.      Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press3.  Results 
The plaintiff and the first defendant face an important decision at date 1: they can 
settle the first case or they can take the first case to trial.  The plaintiff's expected payoff at 
trial is  p k h α −   while the defendant's expected payments are  d k h α + .    There is an obvious 
incentive to settle the first case: settlement avoids the total cost of litigation,  d p k k + .  On 
the other hand, litigation reveals information about future dangers and influences the 
precautions chosen by future defendants.  We will see that the plaintiff and the first 
defendant may opt to litigate the first case, despite the cost, if the benefit derived from 
informing the future defendants' effort choices is sufficiently strong. 
 
3.1  Equilibrium  Characterization  
We will proceed by backwards induction.  Suppose that first case has settled.  If 
another accident occurs at date 2 involving defendant Di then the plaintiff and Di will remain 
symmetrically uninformed about the true damages, h.   The  most  that  Di is willing to pay to 
settle the case is  d k h α + , his expected payment if the case goes to trial.  The least the 
plaintiff is willing to accept is  p k h α − , his expected damage award minus his litigation 
costs.
17  Given our earlier assumption concerning the bargaining power of the two parties 
the case involving Di would settle for  h α S2 = .  
When viewed from date 2, a representative defendant Di anticipates paying  h α S2 =  
in the event of an accident.  He therefore chooses his precautions, x, to minimize his 
expected future liability plus his precaution costs: 
                                                        
17  For simplicity, in this paper, we assume that the threat for going to trial is always credible.      http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69) x ( c h α ) x 1 ( Minx + − .                                            
The first-order condition is,   
h α ) x ( c = ′ .                  ( 1 )  
In other words, theh defendant invests to the point where his marginal cost of precautions is 
exactly offset by his marginal benefit associated with reducing the probability of an accident.   
We can write the representative defendant's precaution, x, as a function of the expected 
damages,  h , and the liability rule,  α:  
) ; ( α h g x = .                    ( 2 )  
As expected, one can show that the equilibrium precautions are increasing in the expected 
harm,  h , and the defendant's share of the damages,  α .  Finally, conditional upon settling 
at date 1, the plaintiff's expected loss associated with the representative defendant is: 
  h ) α 1 )]( α ; h ( g 1 [ ) α ; h ( LP − − = ,           ( 3 )  
the probability of an accident multiplied by the plaintiff's share of the damages. 
 Now suppose instead that the plaintiff and the first defendant take the first case to 
trial.  The future defendants subsequently learn the true value of h from the investigations 
that are made public.  When making his date 2 precaution choice, our representative 
defendant, Di, anticipates settling for  h α S2 =   in the future (should an accident arise).    Di's 
optimal precaution is now a function of the true damages h rather than the average damages 
h : 
) ; ( α h g x = .   
Conditional upon pursuing a litigation strategy at date 1, the plaintiff's expected loss 
associated with the representative defendant is: 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press∫ =
∞
0
P P dh ) h ( f ) α ; h ( L )) α ; h ( L ( E  
where  ) α ; h ( LP   is defined above. 
We can now construct the bargaining range at date 1.    The plaintiff's expected payoff 
conditional upon going to trial is  )) α ; h ( L ( E ) 1 N ( k h α P p ∗ − − − , the expected damages 
from trial minus his expected losses associated with the future defendants.  If he settles for 
1 S , on the other hand, his payoff would be  ) α ; h ( L ) 1 N ( S P 1 ∗ − − .  Combining these 
expressions shows that the least that the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement,  1 S , is: 
))] α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( k h α S P P p 1 − ∗ − + − = .            ( 4 )  
This expression reflects the fact that litigation creates and discloses public information that 
subsequently affects the precautions of the defendant.  The upper bound on the settlement 
range, or the most the first defendant is willing to pay, is simply 
  d 1 k h α S + = .                   ( 5 )    
Taken together we see that settlement occurs if and only if  1 1 S S ≤  or: 
))] α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( k P P − ∗ − ≥ .           ( 6 )  
 
Proposition 1: Define  ))] α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( k ˆ
P P − ∗ − = .  If the total litigation costs 
are above this cutoff,  k k ˆ ≥ , then the plaintiff and the first defendant settle out of court at 
date 1.  If the litigation costs are below this cutoff,  k ˆ k < , then the first case goes to trial. 
Furthermore, if 
(i)    0 = α  then  0 ˆ = k ; 
(ii)   ) 1 , 0 ( α∈  then  0 ˆ > k ; 
(iii)  1 α =  then  0 k ˆ = .  http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69 
Proof:  In order to prove our result we will show that  ) α ; h ( LP  is a strictly concave 
function of h for  ) 1 , 0 ( α∈  and is linear when  1 α =  and  0 = α .  Differentiating 
) α ; h ( LP   with respect to h twice shows us that: 
() )] α ; h ( g h ) α ; h ( g 2 )[ α 1 ( α ; h ' ' LP ′′ + ′ − − = .              ( 7 )  
We see right away that  () 0 1 ; h ' ' LP =  for  all  h which implies that  0 ) 1 ; h ( L ( E ) 1 ; h ( L P P = − .  
Recall that the representative defendant's precaution level,  ) ; ( α h g x = , is implicitly defined 
by  h α )) α ; h ( g ( ' c = .  Differentiating this expression gives 
1 ))] ; ( ( [ ) ; (
− ′′ = ′ α α α h g c h g ,.  
Since  0 ) x ( c > ′′  we know that this is strictly positive when  0 α >  and zero when  0 = α . 
Totally differentiating with respect to h again gives 
3 2 )] ( /[ ) ( ) ; (
− ′′ ′′′ − = ′′ x c x c h g α α , which is 
again strictly positive when  0 α >  and  () 0 x c < ′′′  and zero otherwise.  We conclude that 
the plaintiff's continuation payoff is linear when  0 = α  and is a strictly concave function of 
h for all  ) 1 , 0 ( α∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
These results may be understood intuitively.  When  0 = α  the plaintiff bears all of 
the damages from the accident.    Since the defendants bear no responsibility for the accidents 
they cause they take no precautions to avoid accidents (x = 0).   At this extreme, the 
plaintiff gains nothing from early litigation and so the first case always settles.    At the other 
extreme, when  1 = α  the defendant bears 100% responsibility for the plaintiff's damages.  
The plaintiff again gains nothing from litigating the first case because his continuation losses 
are zero:  0 ) 1 ; h ( L ( E ) 1 ; h ( L P P = = .  In the intermediate range,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α , however, the 
early case may go to trial in equilibrium.  The future defendants respond to information by  Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressfine-tuning investments and the plaintiff captures some social value through his share,  α 1− , 
of the damages. 
 
3.2    The Divergence Between the Private and Social Incentive to Settle 
  The decision of the plaintiff and the first defendant to litigate or settle at date 1 does 
not necessarily correspond to the best decision from a social welfare perspective.    If the first 
cases settles out of court, then the future defendants choose precautions based on the average 
damages,  h .    The representative defendant's expected future losses may be written as: 
)) α ; h ( g ( c h α )) α ; h ( g 1 ( ) α ; h ( LD + − = .           ( 8 )  
If the first case went to trial instead, the future defendants would fine-tune their precautions 




D D dh ) h ( f ) α ; h ( L )) α ; h ( L ( E .              
The next lemma states that, for all liability regimes where  0 > α  (so the defendants bear 
some responsibility for the damages), the future defendants benefit from more information 
about damage levels.  In short, the decision to settle the first case before investigations are 
conducted imposes a negative externality on future defendants.     
 
Lemma 1: When  0 > α  then  )) α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L D D > ; future defendants strictly benefit 
from early litigation. When  0 α =  then  0 )) α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L D D = = ; future defendants 
derive no value from early litigation.   
 
Proof:  To show that  () α ; h LD  is concave we take the derivative with respect to h.  By 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69envelope theorem we may ignore the effect of h on precautions and so we have 
α )) α ; h ( g 1 ( ) α ; h ( ' LD − =  and  ) α ; h ( g α ) α ; h ( " LD ′ − = .  As in the proof of Proposition 1 
we have that  0 ))] α ; h ( g ( c [ α ) α ; h ( g
1 > ′′ = ′ −  for all  0 > α .  Therefore  0 ) α ; h ( VD < ′′ .   
When  0 = α , however, the future defendants take no precautions and so 
0 )) α ; h ( V ( E ) α ; h ( V D D = = .                        
Q.E.D. 
 
 The plaintiff and the first defendant, as shown above, will choose to settle the first 
case when  k ˆ k ≥ .  The future defendants, on the other hand, benefit from the information 
revealed through early litigation.  Since the plaintiff and the first defendant do not 
internalize the benefit that accrues to the future defendant, there is a divergence in the 
direction of “too few trials”.  
The next proposition characterizes the optimal litigation decision from a social 
welfare perspective.  The social planner would take into account the payoffs of all players, 
including the future defendants, when determining whether settlement or litigation is 
appropriate.    
 
Proposition 2:  Define 
))] α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( ))] α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( k
~
D D P P − ∗ − + − ∗ − = .   (9) 
If  k k
~
≥  then social welfare is highest if the first case settles at date 1 and if  k ˆ k <  then 
social welfare is highest if the first case goes to trial.    Furthermore, if 
(i)   0 = α  then  0 k ˆ k
~
= = ; 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press(ii)   ) 1 , 0 ( α∈  then  0 k ˆ k
~
> > ; 
(iii)  1 α =  then  0 k ˆ k
~
= > . 
 
Proof: Social welfare is higher with date 1 settlement when 
k ))] α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L ( E [ ) 1 N ( )] α ; h ( L ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( D P D P + + ∗ − ≤ + ∗ −  which  gives 
the expression for  k
~
  in the proposition.    The results follow immediately from definition of 
k ˆ  and the previous results.     
Q.E.D. 
 
  In the proposition,  ))] α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( P P − ∗ −   is the plaintiff and the first 
defendant’s additional joint private benefit from litigating the first case rather than settling 
while  ))] α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L [ * ) 1 N ( D D − −  is the joint benefit of the future defendants.  
When  0 = α   there is no benefit from having information revealed, so it is both privately and 
socially optimal for all cases to settle:  0 k ˆ k
~
= = .  When  0 > α , then the later defendants 
gain surplus from early litigation,  )) α ; h ( L ( E )) α ; h ( L D D −  >  0, and so the socially planner 
would choose to go to trial more often than arises in the private equilibrium.  We have the 
following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1:    For litigation costs in the range  )
~
, ˆ ( k k k ∈   the plaintiff and the first defendant 
choose to settle the first case even though it is in the best interest of society for the first case 
to go to trial. For litigation costs outside this range the private and social incentives to litigate 
are aligned. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art693.3    The Optimal Liability Rule 
The preceding analysis took  α , the proportion of damages borne by defendants, as 
exogenous.  What if a social planner could choose the liability rule optimally instead?  On 
the one hand, setting  1 = α   will    have a positive effect on the second defendant's incentives 
to take precautions.    Taking the decision of the defendant to litigate or settle the first case as 
given,  1 = α  better aligns the incentives of the future defendants with the incentives of 
society more broadly.  But the social planner's choice of liability rule also affects the 
plaintiff's and the first defendant’s decision to settle the case at date 1.  When  1 = α , as 
shown in proposition 1,  the first case would settle out of court.  The information about h 
would remain hidden, preventing the future defendants from fine-tuning their precautions.     
Take instead the liability rule where  0 = α , so the plaintiff and the first defendant 
strictly  prefer to settle rather than litigate the first case.  This α   cannot be an optimal 
liability rule: by increasing  α   slightly while keeping the private incentive for settlement, the 
social planner enhances the future defendants' incentives to take precautions.  Similarly, 
suppose that the liability rule is  1 < α  such that  k k ˆ < , the plaintiff and the first defendant 
strictly  prefer to litigate rather than settle the first case.  This α   cannot be an optimal 
liability rule: by increasing  α   slightly while keeping the incentive for litigation, we could 
give the future defendants stronger incentives to invest in precautions.  Indeed, the optimal 
liability rule  * α   must have the property that it is either one (so the first case settles) or it is 
the largest positive number that makes the plaintiff and the first defendant indifferent between 
litigating and settling the first case.   
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressProposition 3: The optimal liability parameter is either  1 * α =   or the largest value of  α   that 
satisfies  k )] α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( P P ≥ − ∗ − .
18  In the former case the first suit settles; no 
information is released but the future defendants are optimally deterred.  In the latter case 
the first suit goes to trial; information is released but the future defendants take too few 
precautions.   
 
This result also suggests circumstances where the private and social incentives to 
litigate diverge, even when the liability rule is chosen optimally.  For example, if  1 * α =  
and  k
~
k <  then the plaintiff and the first defendant may choose to settle the first case even 
though it is in society's interest for the first case to go to trial.  The next example illustrates 
that this latter situation can indeed arise for a certain range of parameter values.   
                                                        
18 When  k )] α ; h ( L ( E ) α ; h ( L [ ) 1 N ( P P = − ∗ − , the plaintiff and the first defendant are 
actually indifferent between settlement and litigation.  We assume that the defendant will 
choose litigation in this knife-edged case.    http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art693.4  Example.   
  Suppose that N = 2, so there is exactly one future defendant.  Suppose further that 
2 ) 2 1 ( ) ( x x c =  and  that  ) (h f   is uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0,1] so  2 / 1 = h .  
Also for simplicity, suppose  1 = θ  so that the plaintiff always requests the settlement offer, 
and that  0 = D k  and  k kP = . D2's precaution choice takes a simple form:  h h g x α α = = ) ; ( .  
P's expected future losses are 
2
P h ) α 1 )( 1 N ( h ) α 1 [( ) α ; h ( L − − − − =   and  P  and  D2's joint 
expected losses are 
2
D P h ) 2 / α 1 ( α h ) α ; h ( L ) α ; h ( L ) α ; h ( L − − = + = .  Note that both are 
concave functions of h.  We have  ) 1 ( ) 12 / 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) ( ( ˆ 2 2 α α α α − = − − = h h E k .  We also 
find that  ) 2 / 1 ( ) 12 / 1 ( ) 2 / 1 ( ) ) ( (
~ 2 2 α α α − = − − = a h h E k .  Note that  0 ˆ ~
≥ > k k  for all 
] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α  and  0 ˆ ~
= = k k  when  0 = α .  
Now given  k , define the optimal liability rule be  () k * α . From earlier result on the 
optimal liability rule, we must have either  () 1 k * α =  or   k *) α 1 ( * α ) 12 / 1 ( = − .  If 
() 1 k * α = , there is settlement and the future losses are  8 / 3 ) 1 ; h ( L = .  If 
k *) α 1 ( * α ) 12 / 1 ( = − , there is litigation and the loss is 
() 12 / * α 4 / * α 2 / 1 k 6 / * α 3 / * α 2 / 1 ] k * α ; h L [ E
2 2 + − = + + − = + , which is smaller than 
3/8 when  2 / ) 3 3 ( * α − ≤ .  Therefore, if  24 / ) 3 3 2 ( − ≤ k , the optimal liability rule is 
() k * α  satisfying  k *) α 1 ( * α ) 12 / 1 ( = − ; if  24 / ) 3 3 2 ( − > k , the optimal liability rule is 
() 0 k * α = .  Finally notice there is divergence if  24 / 1 24 / ) 3 3 2 ( < < − k :  () 1 k * α =  so 
that defendant would settle with P1, but litigation is socially optimal since  24 / 1
~
= < k k . 
 
  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press4.    A Simple Example with Asymmetric Information 
The previous section focused on a setting where private parties tend to settle too often.  
They choose to settle to avoid their private litigation costs, not internalizing the social 
benefits of the information made public through trial.    This result may be reversed, however, 
when other factors are introduced.  In particular, when the early litigants are privately 
informed they will engage in rent-seeking activities and take tough bargaining stances in an 
attempt to extract a greater share of the bargaining surplus.  This will lead to bargaining 
failures and costly trials.    The rent-seeking motive is purely redistributive and is not aligned 
with the motives of a social planner.     
We modify the previous model in several ways to explore the role of asymmetric 
information.  First, we change the information structure.  Suppose that the plaintiff has 
private information about his harm level, h, when negotiating with the first defendant at date 
1 and the first defendant knows that the plaintiff has this information.    At date 2, the  1 N −  
future defendants update their beliefs based on the disposition of the earlier case and choose 
their precautions accordingly.  At date 3 we assume that the future defendants observe the 
plaintiff's damages should an accident occur so there is symmetric information at date 3.  
We also assume that h is uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0,1], that the defendants' 
cost of precautions is quadratic, 
2 x 5 . ) x ( c = , and that the defendants have the power to 
make take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers, so  0 θ = .  In this way, the negotiations at date 2 
resemble the screening model in Bebchuk (1984).    The property that  0 k θ k ) θ 1 ( d p = − −  is 
maintained by assuming that the plaintiff's litigation cost is zero or, alternatively, that the 
English Rule for allocating the litigation costs is in effect.    In all other respects, however, the 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69model here is the same as before. 
 
Lemma 2:  Suppose that the uninformed defendant, D1, has offered to settle with the 
privately informed plaintiff for  1 S .  The continuation equilibrium features a cutoff,  1 h , 
implicitly defined by  1
2
1 1 S h ] 2 / ) 1 N )( α 1 ( α [ h α = − − +  if  2 / ) 1 N )( α 1 ( α α S1 − − + <  
and  1 h1 =  otherwise. 
i.  If  1 h h ≤  then  P accepts  1 S  at date 1.  Each of the  1 N −  future defendants take 
precautions  2 / ah1   each and subsequently settle out of court for  ah S2 = . 
ii.  If  1 h h >  then P rejects  1 S  at date 1 and goes to trial.  Each of the  1 N −  future 
defendants take precautions  ah   and subsequently settle out of court for  ah S2 = . 
 
Proof:  We will begin at date 3 and work backwards.  At date 3 the plaintiff and the 
defendants become symmetrically informed about damages so the defendants who caused 
accidents will settled out of court for  ah S2 = , regardless of the outcome of the earlier case.   
The outcome of the earlier case will affect the defendants' precautions at date 2, however.    If 
the first case went to trial then the representative defendant learns the true damages and sets 
ah ) x ( ' c = , giving  ah x = .    If the first case settled then the representative defendant knows 
that the plaintiff's damages are in the truncated uniform distribution on  ] h , 0 [ 1 , so the 
expected harm is  2 / h1 .    The defendant therefore takes precautions  2 / ah x 1 = .   
  Now let's consider the plaintiff's decision about whether to accept an offer at date 1.   
In general, a plaintiff of type h has an expected future loss  h ) α 1 )( x 1 )( 1 N ( − − − , the 
number of future defendants multiplied by the probability of an accident multiplied by the 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressplaintiff's share of the damages.  These losses influence the plaintiff's decision to accept a 
settlement offer,  1 S .  If the plaintiff accepts  1 S  he gets  h ) α 1 )( 2 / ah 1 )( 1 N ( S 1 1 − − − −  
and if he rejects  1 S  and goes to trial he gets  h ) α 1 )( ah 1 )( 1 N ( h α − − − − .  Setting these 
two expressions equal to each other we find the interior value for  1 h  as defined in the 




Lemma 3:   D1's optimal cutoff, h ˆ , is the positive root of the following quadratic 
expression  0 k h ˆ ) α 1 ( α ) 1 N )( 2 / 3 ( h ˆ α
2 = − − − +  when that root is smaller than 1 and 
1 h ˆ =   otherwise.  The social planner's optimal cutoff, h
~ , is the positive root of 
0 k h
~
) 2 / α 1 ( α ) 1 N )( 4 / 1 (
2 = − − −   when that root is smaller than 1 and  1 h
~
=   otherwise. 
 
Proof:    The first defendant chooses  1 h   to minimize his expected payments to the plaintiff.     











∫ + + ∫ − − + . 
The first term captures the settlement payments to the plaintiff types below the cutoff and the 
second term are the defendant's payments at trial associated with the plaintiff types above the 
cutoff.  Differentiating this expression once gives the first-order condition defining  h ˆ  in 
the Lemma and it is easy to see that the second-order condition holds.  The social planner, 
on the other hand, would choose the cutoff  1 h  to minimize the social losses, which include 
the litigation costs at date 1, the precautions at date 2, and the accident losses at date 3: 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art69k ] h 1 [ Min 1
h1



















Differentiating this expression gives the social planner's optimal cutoff,  h
~ , as in the lemma.   
The second-order condition holds. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4:  I f   11 / 10 a <  then there are too many trials in equilibrium ( h
~
h ˆ < ).  If 
11 / 10 a >  then there exists a finite and positive cutoff, 
2 ) 10 α 11 /( ) α 2 ( α 2 ) α ( * γ − − = .  
If  ) α ( * γ k ) 1 N ( > −   then there are too few trials in equilibrium ( h
~
h ˆ > ) and if 
) α ( * γ k ) 1 N ( < −   then there are too many trials in equilibrium ( h
~
h ˆ < ). 
 
Proof:  Consider the first order conditions in the previous lemma, and define 
k h ) α 1 ( α ) 1 N )( 2 / 3 ( h α ) h ( g ˆ 2 − − − + =  and  k h ) 2 / α 1 ( α ) 1 N )( 4 / 1 ( ) h ( g ~ 2 − − − = .  
These are increasing functions of h and take on the value 0 at the values h ˆ  and h
~ , 



















' h .    If   11 / 10 a <  
then h' < 0 and, since  k ) 0 ( g ~ ) 0 ( g ˆ − = =  and  ) 0 ( ' g ~ ) 0 ( ' g ˆ >  we know that  ) h ( g ~ ) h ( g ˆ >  
for all h > 0.  We therefore conclude that  h
~
h ˆ < .  If  11 / 10 a >  then h' > 0 and so 
) h ( g ~ ) h ( g ˆ >  for all  ' h h 0 < <  and  ) h ( g ~ ) h ( g ˆ <  for all  ' h h > .  Using the definition of 
h
~  in the lemma we see that when  ) α ( * γ k ) 1 N ( > −  then  ' h h
~
>  and so  h
~
h ˆ > .  If 
) α ( * γ k ) 1 N ( > − , on the other hand, then  ' h h
~
<  and  so  h
~
h ˆ < . 
Q.E.D. 
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This paper has explored a new efficiency rationale for litigation.  The public 
information created by legal investigations creates economic value when future actors 
fine-tune their decisions in response to the information revealed through litigation activities.  
In contrast, when early cases settle before thorough investigations are conducted then a 
negative externality is imposed on the future actors.  This rationale suggests an important 
tradeoff in the design of liability rules.  First, imposing liability on long-run players (the 
defendant in our model) provides those players with greater incentives to litigate early claims.   
When held liable for future harms, the long-run players benefits from the improvement in 
public information that results from their litigation activities. On the other hand, shifting 
liability to the long-run players dampens the incentives of future players (plaintiffs in our 
model) to mitigate their risks. 
Our basic framework may be extended in a number of ways.  First, one could 
generalize the liability rule to consider decoupled damages (see Polinsky and Che, 1991).  
Assuming that plaintiffs pursue all claims, making the defendant in our model responsible for 
100% of all future damages would align the private and social incentives to litigate rather 
than settle, while making the plaintiffs 100% responsible for their harms creates the right 
accident avoidance activities.  This scheme may be implemented with a 100% tax on the 
plaintiffs' award.  Our model has also abstracted from accident avoidance activities of the 
plaintiff.    The plaintiff may be able to take precautions to reduce the risk of future accidents 
as well.    These, and other issues, remain topics for future research. 
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